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Abstract
While the topic of interorganisational trust is gaining attention in academic
literature, research on developing countries remains sparse. With the premise
that certain contextual elements may be more relevant for developing countries,
we expand on existing models by testing the effect of initial support, use of just-
in-time delivery, and informal commitment to predict the trust that Turkish
automotive suppliers have towards their buyers. The results support the
predictions that soft technologies and informal commitment increase trust.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of trust between two parties in an exchange
seems to be a critical point that is emphasised within the broader
framework of buyer–supplier relations, as reflected by the pro-
liferation of recent literature expanding the concept of interperso-
nal trust to the domain of interorganisational relations (e.g., Gao,
Sirgy, & Bird, 2005; Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood,
2004; Kwon & Suh, 2005; Miyamoto & Rexha, 2004). Most of the
extant literature on trust in buyer–supplier relations has been based
on American or Japanese firms, and has often contrasted the
institutionalised forms of trust relationship in Japan with the
explicit contracts in the US (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 1999). Nevertheless,
it is becoming more common to see research on governing and
facilitating business exchanges, and on trust in supplier relations,
in geographical areas or firms of nationalities other than the US
and Japan (e.g., Nguyen, Weinstein, & Meyer, 2005; Wong, Then, &
Skitmore, 2000; Yilmaz, Sezen, & Ozdemir, 2005). In one of the
more recent and comprehensive studies on trust antecedents, Dyer
and Chu (2000) tested a model of buyer–supplier trust focusing
specifically on the automotive industry across the US and Japan, as
well as South Korea. Defining trust in a similar way to goodwill
trust (Sako, 1992), the authors argued that the length of the
relationship, the extent of face-to-face communication between
the parties, continuous repeated exchange, assistance provided by
the buyer, and the buyer’s ownership of supplier stock would
positively predict the supplier’s trust in the buyer. Using data from
135 US, 101 Japanese and 217 Korean automotive suppliers, the
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authors found different results across countries,
suggesting that the context plays an important role
in influencing inter-firm trust.
This study will investigate the trust of suppliers
towards their buyers in the Turkish automotive
sector, which is the third largest industry in Turkey.
While studies such as Gules, Burgess, and Lynch
(1997) and Wasti (1998) have provided detailed
background information on buyer–supplier rela-
tions in the Turkish auto industry, the factors
affecting the development of trust between
exchange partners in particular have not been
investigated. Specifically, this study aims to com-
plement the model developed by Dyer and Chu
(2000) with variables that may be particularly
relevant for a developing country such as Turkey.
Economic transactions and institutional configura-
tions are significantly influenced by trust relation-
ships in developing countries, which are
characterised by the absence of strong legal regimes
(Choi et al., 1999; Humphrey, 1998; Humphrey &
Schmitz, 1998), rapidly growing economies, struc-
turally dynamic industries, volatile but promising
markets, regulatory systems in undergoing transi-
tion, and widespread opportunism (Luo, 2006). In
emerging markets, governmental regulations are
more variable, market information is harder to
verify, and legal systems allow contracts to be
ignored more often (Luo, 2006). In the present
analysis, it will be argued that, when organisations
are faced with environmental uncertainty and
complexity, they may prefer, or actively seek to
design, a governance structure that could try to
develop a partner-specific trust (Choi et al., 1999;
Luo, 2006). Considering that much of the existing
research on buyer–supplier relations is set in
industrialised contexts, the present analysis is
expected to provide important insights into the
generalisability of current models, as well as
contribute to the building of a more universal
understanding of trust.
The paper is structured as follows. Drawing on the
historical evolution of buyer–supplier relations in
the Turkish automotive industry presented below,
the next section will advance hypotheses regarding
antecedents of trust (namely, initial support from
the buyer, the use of soft technologies such as just-
in-time (JIT) in purchasing, and the buyer’s infor-
mal commitment) thought to be particularly
relevant to developing country contexts. The
methods section will describe the study’s measures,
methods, and sample, followed by the results. The
discussion section will evaluate the contribution of
the proposed antecedents in explaining suppliers’
trust towards their buyers over and above variables
previously investigated by Dyer and Chu (2000).
The paper will end with a discussion of the
limitations and main conclusions.
THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF BUYER–
SUPPLIER RELATIONS IN THE TURKISH
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
The first automotive assembly operation in Turkey
began in 1929, though substantial development of
the industry did not start until the 1960s (see
Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the develop-
ments in the early stages of the Turkish automotive
industry). From 1954 to 1980, a period during
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Figure 1 Timeline of the early history of the Turkish automotive industry. Based on Azcanlı (1995), Erdogˇdu (1999) and Gules et al.
(1997).
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which an import substitution strategy was adopted,
local content was encouraged and a protection
from foreign competition was observed. This
prompted foreign automakers to produce locally
through joint ventures with Turkish partners;
hence the Fiat SpA Torino Group and Renault
began production in 1971. Yet the stringent
technology transfer and licensing agreements with
these foreign firms prevented the newly formed
alliances from being competitive in the global
market. Although overcapacity existed in the
automotive sector by 1964, new investments were
supported, which resulted in the assemblers produ-
cing most of their components in-house. Because of
the large number of models, economies of scale
could not be reached, and the local suppliers could
not fully develop themselves. With the limitations
on imports, local suppliers also lacked the drive to
enhance quality. The local automakers opted to
take advantage of the protected market, and
emphasised price over quality when outsourcing
(Nedimogˇlu, 1997). While this situation can be
described as arm’s length relationships between
buyers and suppliers, the initial scarcity of local
suppliers stimulated the automakers to offer tech-
nical and financial support to potential suppliers in
order to persuade them to commence production
for the growing automotive sector.
In the 1980s the import substitution strategy was
replaced with an export-oriented one, which
removed quotas of local contents and enabled
assemblers to look overseas for better suppliers. To
maintain their cost competitiveness, assemblers put
a great deal of pressure on their suppliers, increas-
ing their requirements in the areas of quality,
delivery and flexibility, and playing suppliers off
against each other (Burgess & Gules, 1998).
Beginning with Opel in 1989 and Toyota in 1990,
the government allowed new foreign investments.
Tax rates on imported vehicles were also reduced
during the 1990s, forcing assemblers to compete
head on with overseas competition. Meanwhile,
Honda and Hyundai both started production in
1997, which increased the proportion of locally
produced models that did not have a local supplier
base in Turkey. Automakers preferred to import
from multinational supplier firms that could reach
economies of scale and provide better quality. Local
suppliers were pushed towards exporting their
products and also getting the quality certifications
required in the European market. Further, with the
Customs Union agreement with the European
Community, Turkey agreed to adopt the standardi-
sation, measurement, accreditation, test, and certi-
fication legislation of the Community. Efforts at
getting ISO 9000–9001 certifications turned into an
institutionalised norm, and increasing numbers of
suppliers are receiving internationally accepted
quality certifications (Akbulut, 1997; Bedir, 1999,
2002; Kuruu¨zu¨m & Anafarta, 2001).1
In the late 1990s, the relationships turned into a
quasi-collaborative stage, where assemblers reduced
their number of direct suppliers and encouraged
them to build partnerships (particularly with
foreign component suppliers) to reach economic
production scales, the latest technology, and higher
quality (Burgess & Gules, 1998). As assemblers often
retained the option of importing parts, suppliers
were reluctant to get locked into a relationship with
a particular buyer, owing to the demand volatility
and economic circumstances. The level of technical
support, while focusing on meeting the assemblers’
demands, was relatively higher than before. Owing
to the increased integration with the global econ-
omy, there are signs that the collaborative arrange-
ments between buyers and suppliers will increase in
number and depth in the coming years (e.g., Bedir,
1999, 2002; Gules et al., 1997; Sanyer, 2002;
TAYSAD, 2003).
HYPOTHESES
As can be seen in the previous section, the Turkish
automotive industry is a relatively young one, with
full-scale mass production having a history of
barely half a century. Furthermore, the develop-
ment of buyer–supplier relationships in Turkey
clearly demonstrates that they have not shown a
consistent pattern since their inception. In this
context, characterised by political and economic
uncertainty, overcapacity, and intense competition,
the history shows rough patches in relationships.
Furthermore, the relatively limited supply base,
while encouraging continuous relations due to
constrained opportunities to switch suppliers, may
have generated mutual dependence, rather than
trust. We argue that, in such a context, it is not the
length or the continuity of the relationship per se
that affects the trust between organisations, con-
trary to some research on buyer–supplier trust (e.g.,
Dyer & Chu, 2000; Gounaris & Venetis, 2002).
Indeed, trust is hard to build when the power
relationship is asymmetrical (Fawcett, Magnan, &
Williams, 2004), and the basis for the development
of trust is particularly in the hands of the dominant
partner (Humphrey & Schmitz, 1998). Sako and
Helper (1998) argue that, in the automotive
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industry, the buyer typically has greater power in
relation to its suppliers. This is particularly true for
Turkey, where the key players in the automotive
business are giant firms by Turkish – and even
regional – standards (O¨z, 1999), whereas the
supplier base consists mostly of SMEs (TAYSAD,
2003), making the latter financially and strategi-
cally more vulnerable. Moreover, manufacturers in
Turkey seek system suppliers rather than individual
parts suppliers. For suppliers to become systems
suppliers, they need to generate the resources
required and develop their own product design
capability and managerial skills, a task that not all
suppliers can achieve without outside help (Ulusoy,
2003), making buyer assistance all the more crucial.
Dyer and Chu (2000) further argue that the auto-
maker’s offer of assistance is considered a signal of
goodwill and commitment, because it suggests the
automaker is genuinely concerned. As an example,
in the Japanese context, the willingness of large
manufacturers to help subcontractors solve various
operational problems has encouraged subcontrac-
tors to respond in a trusting manner (Dyer & Chu,
2000; Hagen and Choe, 1998). The buyer’s invest-
ment in a supply chain partner’s capabilities has
been found to be a significant antecedent of trust in
other contexts as well (Fawcett et al., 2004).
A specific form of support or guidance may be
particularly relevant for understanding buyer–
supplier trust in developing countries such as
Turkey. Gules et al. (1997) have observed that the
elapsed stages of the automotive industry develop-
ment in Turkey follow almost the same pattern as
Lamming’s (1993) four-stage model for more devel-
oped economies. What differs is the first half of the
first phase, which arises from the special conditions
of the early years of the Turkish automotive
industry. During the initial stages of industry
development, vehicles had to contain an increased
percentage of domestically purchased components
each year. As a result of the requirements imposed
by the state, the local content of passenger cars
exceeded 60% at the end of 1973, and the local
content requirements imposed by the automakers’
permit agreements rose to 85% in subsequent years
(Erdogˇdu, 1999). The scarcity of local suppliers and
the obligation of assemblers to increase local supply
stimulated assemblers to provide financial and
technical support to build their own supplier base.
Many suppliers who had not produced automotive
components before were encouraged and supported
in various ways to operate as suppliers to the
automakers. For the suppliers, typically SMEs with
limited financial and technological resources, enter-
ing the growing automotive component business
would not have been possible without such external
help, despite their advantages of low-cost labour.
The phenomenon of initial support continues to
this day, even though many suppliers today have
much better managerial and technical skills and are
active in exports. Facing increasing pressure to
increase new model variety after the Customs
Union with the European Union, high imported
car rates (approaching 70% as of the end of October
2005, according to motor vehicle industry monthly
reports posted at the Automotive Manufacturers’
Association website, www.osd.org.tr), with rela-
tively low numbers in the qualified automotive
supplier base, the local automakers often make offers
to capable local suppliers to commence production
of a component the suppliers may have never
produced before. Turkey is to a large degree depen-
dent on foreign firms’ technology in the automotive
sector, which means that the local automakers have
to translate the technological requirements of new
vehicle models commencing production in Turkey
to the suppliers, who are less technologically
sophisticated than the automakers themselves. In
return, the automaker offers technical support (e.g.,
technical training, joint work on specifications,
technology transfer) and some financial support
(e.g., paying for dies, advance payments).2,3 There-
fore, in order to test whether the support of buyers in
the suppliers’ stage of ‘‘liability of newness’’ (cf.
Stinchcombe, 1965) aids in the generation of trust,
the following hypothesis is advanced:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the provision of initial
support by the buyer, the higher is the supplier’s
trust in the buyer.
Trust requires open communication, not just
selective information exchange (Fawcett et al.,
2004). In other words, trust can thrive only in a
setting of frequent, open, and honest communica-
tion (Fawcett et al., 2004). The intensity of
communication, as reflected in higher levels of
face-to-face communication, was not found to be a
significant predictor of trust in previous studies
(e.g., Dyer & Chu, 2000). In fact, the study by Dyer
and Chu (2000) revealed that the face-to-face meet-
ings of US suppliers were spent unproductively on
negotiations or on assigning blame. One can posit
that the content of communication, the nature of
knowledge transferred, and the reciprocity of the
information exchange are more important than the
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mode (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Kotabe, Martin, &
Domoto, 2003; Liker, Kamath, Wasti, & Nagamachi,
1996; Sako, 1998).
A JIT operation requires much more sophisticated
buyer–supplier communication systems (O’Neal,
1987), thus allowing greater technological diffusion
between the automaker and supplier, and facilitat-
ing easier communication and compatible informa-
tion systems (Turnbull, Oliver, & Wilkinson, 1989,
1992). In part due to the enhanced communica-
tions in such environments, it has been argued that
the rise in total quality management (TQM) and JIT
has resulted in a shift towards cooperative purchas-
ing strategies (Burgess & Gules, 1998; Matthyssens
& Van den Bulte, 1994). In a JIT supplier–buyer
relationship the calculative contract is not appro-
priate (Macbeth, 1987). By forging closer links
between parties, JIT can promote follow-up agree-
ments (Landry, Trudel, & Diorio, 1998).
Burgess and Gules (1998) found that, in line with
the rest of the global automotive industry, there is a
restructuring process in the Turkish automotive
industry towards soft technologies. The transplant-
ing of Japanese manufacturing practices is one
factor behind the change towards more collabora-
tive buyer–supplier relations in Turkey (Anon,
October 1995a, b; Burgess and Gules, 1998; Gules
et al., 1997). Burgess and Gules’s (1998) data also
showed that buyers sought more collaborative
relationships with their suppliers as they increased
the level of soft technology implementation.
Research indicates that, under conditions of envir-
onmental uncertainty, buyer firms are less likely to
make supplier-specific investments (Bensaou &
Anderson, 1999; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). We
propose that if a buyer firm makes supplier-specific
investments (such as JIT), even under conditions of
chronic environmental uncertainty (typical of
developing countries), it will be a strong predictor
of supplier trust. Under high uncertainty condi-
tions, there will be a greater need to stay close to
one another. That means partners will interact and
exchange information more frequently, and such
behaviours are important for the development of
trust (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Larson, 1992).
Hence, considering the trust-developing features
of enhanced communications in JIT-type environ-
ments, the following hypothesis is advanced:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the buyer’s implemen-
tation of collaborative practices with the supplier
through the usage of soft technologies such as JIT,
the higher is the supplier’s trust in the buyer.
The majority of literature in economics and
management on contract enforcement has focused
on the use of formal, legally enforceable agree-
ments (Choi, 1994), which are the basis of formal
commitments in business relations. Informal com-
mitment, on the other hand, has a stronger
attitudinal component and is strongly related to
trust (Mudambi & Helper, 1998). According to the
typology developed by Mudambi and Helper
(1998), the type of commitment is a function of
the strength of the legal and social institutions in
the environment. In an environment with free
markets, good information availability, and strong
legal institutions (as is predominantly the case in
developed countries), the form of cooperation is
likely to be formal. However, in an environment
where society is relatively closed and there are
strong informal institutions such as social norms
and traditions (i.e., the social institutions are
strong), and where legal institutions are weak, the
predominant form of commitment is informal.
This type of environment is more typical of
developing countries.
The notion of informal commitment may be
particularly relevant for the Turkish context, which
is characterised by a slow and cumbersome judicial
system (TU¨SI˙AD, 1998, 2002). As legal contracts are
difficult to enforce, the contracts are generally short
term, and the volatility of the economic circum-
stances encourages or even legitimises breaking of
promises (Bedir, 1999, 2002).4 In the Turkish
economic and legal institutional framework, con-
tracts can even increase costs: in an inflationist
economy, waiting for the results of a court case can
be more costly than the benefits that can be gained
(Oba & Semercio¨z, 2005). Therefore it is argued that
suppliers will try to infer the level of commitment
of the buyer not by explicit sanctions or reliance on
written contract terms, but through certain infor-
mal actions that provide assurance.
As noted earlier, in addition to the peculiarities of
the institutional environment, social norms also
affect the type of commitment. Collectivist cultures
such as Japan, Korea and Turkey (Hofstede, 1980)
are characterised as high-context cultures, in which
the external environment, situation, and non-
verbal behaviour are crucial for communication
(Boyacıgiller & Adler, 1991). In contrast to low-
context cultures such as the United States, where
the emphasis is on legal documents, high-context
cultures rely more on face-to-face personal agree-
ment. Indeed, subcontracting in Japan is relational,
and draws on face-to-face relations to help enforce
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minimally specified contracts (Hagen & Choe,
1998). In a recent study by Oba and Semercio¨z
(2005) on inter-firm relations in a Turkish industrial
district, 97% of the Turkish respondents stated
that they do not use contracts in their trans-
actions.5 Thus, in such a context, it is predicted
that trust will be enhanced by the buyer signalling
commitment beyond simply fulfilling letter of
the contract:
Hypothesis 3: The greater a buyer’s informal
commitments to a supplier, the higher will be the
supplier’s trust in the buyer.
METHOD
Participants and Procedure
A preliminary questionnaire was developed and
presented for comments to numerous officials from
automotive companies (both buyers and suppliers)
and automotive associations by way of interviews
that lasted an average of 1.5 h. With the feedback
received in the pretests, a self-administered mail
questionnaire was designed and sent to over 300
Turkish automotive parts suppliers. The results
presented in this paper are based on 106 responses,
resulting in a response rate of approximately 30%.
Given that this was a lengthy and detailed ques-
tionnaire of 10 pages, the response rate comes
across as reasonable.6 The public guides that were
used to construct the mailing list did not
provide additional information about the suppliers,
hence only a comparison of early and late respon-
dents was done on key variables to test for non-
response bias, and no significant differences were
noted. Since the questionnaire asks quite a few
questions about supplier views and obstacles regard-
ing product development, it is possible that the
responses might show a bias towards technologically
superior suppliers who have some background and
capability in product or process innovations and
who were not alienated by such questions.
Measures
Trust. A trust measure was formed by the
summation of the following three items, to be
answered keeping the supplier’s main customer in
mind and measured on a five-point Likert scale,
ranging from ‘‘none’’ to ‘‘very much’’:
(1) ‘‘Does your main customer have a market
reputation as being trustworthy and fair?’’
(2) ‘‘Is your main customer fair towards you?’’
(3) ‘‘If your main customer asked you to make a
customer-specific investment without a written
contract, how willing would your company be?’’
Initial support. Initial support or guidance provided
by the buyer at the foundation stage was measured
with a single item, to which a dichotomous yes/no
response option was provided:
‘‘Did your company commence the production of
your main component with the guidance and
support of your main customer?’’
JIT. This variable attempts to understand the extent
to which the buyer has utilised soft technologies
such as JIT, which incorporate cooperative
purchasing strategies that increase the inter-
dependence and communication between the
buyer and the supplier. The suppliers were asked
the following question:
‘‘Does your company deliver its products to its
main customer just-in-time?’’
The response was made on a dichotomous yes/no
scale.
Informal commitment. Informal commitment was
measured by the summation of the following items,
using a five-point response scale ranging from ‘‘1:
Not at all’’ to ‘‘5: Very much’’. The first three items
were reverse-coded so that higher scores indicated
higher levels of informal commitment.
(1) ‘‘Does your main customer use other domestic
suppliers as an ace up its sleeve?’’
(2) ‘‘Does your main customer use foreign suppliers
as an ace up its sleeve?’’
(3) ‘‘Does your main customer move to another
supplier at the purchasing stage even after it has
established close relations with your company
earlier?’’
(4) ‘‘Does your main customer give you guaranteed
orders?’’
Control variables7. Organisation size (operation-
alised as the number of employees at the firm
level), and technological uncertainty (operation-
alised as the technological uncertainty of the
component) were included in the analysis as
control variables. The technological uncertainty
measure consisted of two items, which assessed the
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frequency of technological change in the product
(response scale ranging from ‘‘1¼Very infrequent’’
to ‘‘5¼Very frequent’’) and the extent of change in
product design over the last 5 years (response scale
ranging from ‘‘1¼No change’’ to ‘‘4¼Complete
change’’). Responses to both items were standard-
ised and combined into a summated index.
The survey administered in the Turkish automo-
tive industry also allowed the testing of Dyer and
Chu’s (2000) model of supplier trust. Therefore the
variables in the Dyer and Chu model were included
in the analysis as baseline antecedents of trust. This
not only allowed for a test of the generalisability of
Dyer and Chu’s model to a developing context, but
also enabled an assessment of the added value of
the proposed extensions to the model. The scales
employed to measure the antecedents in the Dyer
and Chu (2000) study are presented below.
 Length of the relationship: Length was operationa-
lised as the number of years since the supplier
first began selling products to the automaker.
 Face-to-face communication: Face-to-face commu-
nication was measured by the following single-
item measure, with a response scale ranging from
0 (‘‘Never’’) to 5 (‘‘Daily’’):8
‘‘Approximately how frequently do your engineers
and technical employees exchange information
regarding the design of your component with
your main customer via face-to-face meetings?’’
 Continuity of the relationship: Relationship con-
tinuity was measured with the following item:
‘‘When a new model of your main customer is
out and you get the business of producing your
component for it, does your company continue
selling the component to your customer during
the entire production cycle of the new model?’’
The response was made on a dichotomous yes/no
scale.
 Automaker assistance to the supplier: Assistance was
measured with three items assessing whether the
automaker provides financial (investing in more
appropriate equipment), technical (e.g., training)
and general assistance (‘‘buying extra compo-
nents, giving you new business, reimbursing you
for stocks not purchased in case of a component
change, etc.’’) Responses were made on a five-
point Likert response scale, and summed into a
scale score, with higher scores indicating higher
levels of assistance.
 Stock ownership: This variable was measured by a
single item, which assessed the percentage of
supplier stock owned by the automaker.
RESULTS
Prior to the analyses, missing values were imputed
for the multi-item scales using the ‘‘two-way
imputation’’ procedure (Bernaards & Sijtsma,
2000), where information from both the person
mean and the item mean is used. For single-item
scales, item means were imputed for missing
values.9 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics
and the correlations among the variables.
To test the hypotheses advanced in the previous
section, a hierarchical regression analysis was
employed. In the first step, organisational size and
product type were entered as control variables. In
the second step, the trust antecedents proposed in
the Dyer and Chu model were entered. In the final
step, the variables regarding the hypothesised
extensions to this model were entered.
The results are presented in Table 2. As can be
seen in the second step of the regression, Dyer and
Chu’s model seems to provide a fairly modest fit to
the Turkish sample in terms of the variance
explained and the number of significant predictors.
The results for the Turkish data indicate that only
assistance is found to be a significant predictor of
trust (b¼0.37, po0.01). In the original study,
assistance was found to be a highly significant
variable in Japan as well as in Korea but not in the
US. In Korea and the US, continuity, or expecta-
tions of repeated exchange, emerged as a significant
variable, but this relationship was not observed for
the Turkish and Japanese data. Only in the Japanese
case was the length of the relationship significantly
positive. Finally, neither for the Turkish sample nor
in the original study did stock ownership and face-
to-face communication predict any significant
variance in explaining trust.
It is clear from Table 2 that the expanded model
has substantially more explanatory power for the
Turkish sample than Dyer and Chu’s baseline
model, both in terms of variance explained and in
terms of significance of factors. In this model both
soft technologies (b¼0.20, po0.05) and informal
commitment (b¼0.22, po0.05) are significant. As
predicted, the usage of JIT is associated with higher
levels of trust: suppliers who deliver their products
to their customers JIT feel more trust towards their
main customer. Further, the more the main custo-
mer signals that it is committed to the supplier, the
more trust the supplier feels. Of the variables in the
original model, again only assistance is significant
(b¼0.39, po0.01). It appears that suppliers receiv-
ing financial and technical help from their custo-
mers feel more trust towards them. In contrast,
Trust in buyer–supplier relations Syeda Nazli Wasti and Syeda Arzu Wasti
124
Journal of International Business Studies
entering their line of business with support and
guidance from its main customer is not associated
with supplier trust. Finally, for exploratory purposes
we also investigated whether the salience of
the expanded model was a function of supplier
experience. Drawing on arguments that firm
experience determines sensitivity to local condi-
tions (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997;
Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003; Luo, 2004), we ran
moderated regression analyses where supplier
Table 2 Standardised regression coefficients (and standard errors) predicting trust
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Step 1: Control Variables
Technological uncertainty 0.19 (0.18) 0.07 (0.17) 0.02 (0.17)
Organisation size 0.09 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001)
Step 2: Dyer and Chu’s model
Length 0.01 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04)
Face 0.08 (0.24) 0.003 (0.22)
Continuity 0.11 (1.40) 0.15 (1.38)
Assistance 0.37** (0.08) 0.39** (0.09)
Stock 0.12 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02)
Step 3: Extensions to Dyer and Chu
Initial support 0.18 (0.57)
Soft technologies (JIT) 0.20* (0.54)
Informal commitment 0.22* (0.07)
R2 0.03 0.21 0.31
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.13 0.22
DR2 0.03 0.18 0.11
F-value 1.15 2.91** 3.47**
*po0.05; **po0.01.
One-tailed tests for hypothesised effects; two-tailed tests for control variables.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable No.
of
items
Mean
(% yes)
s.d. Alpha 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Trust 3 3.73 0.57 0.73
2. Length of the
relationship
1 12.44 7.40 — 0.08
3. Face-to-face
communication
1 2.06 1.17 — 0.15 0.15
4. Continuity 1 (97%) — 0.06 0.06 0.12
5. Assistance 3 2.55 0.67 0.80 0.33** 0.01 0.20 0.07
6. Stock ownership 1 1.81 11.11 — 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.15
7. Initial support 1 (61.5%) — 0.05 0.25* 0.12 0.10 0.27** 0.12
8. Soft
technologies (JIT)
1 (49.5%) — 0.18 0.09 0.01 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.06
9. Informal
commitment
4 3.23 0.48 0.67 0.32** 0.14 0.21 0.10 0.33** 0.09 0.02 0.04
10. Organisation
size
1 246.92 358.37 — 0.003 0.11 0.22* 0.06 0.12 0.27** 0.03 0.06 0.08
11. Technological
uncertainty
2 0 1.73 0.67 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.25* 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.49**
*po0.05 (two-tailed); **po0.01 (two-tailed).
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experience in terms of producing the main compo-
nent (in years) was included as a control variable
and interaction terms for supplier experience with
usage, informal commitment, and initial support
were entered in the final step. However, the results
did not reveal main or interactive effects for this
variable.
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the trust of suppliers
towards their buyers in the Turkish automotive
sector, testing variables that may be particularly
relevant for developing countries. The results
revealed the use of soft technologies (operationa-
lised as the use of JIT delivery) to be significantly
associated with trust. As suggested by Burgess and
Gules (1998) for the Turkish context, soft technol-
ogies such as TQM and JIT are demanding in their
implementation, requiring the strong support of
suppliers. Indeed, in developing country contexts it
is often the case that soft technologies, particularly
JIT, are introduced and extensively developed by
multinational buyers that seek cost-effective ways
of maintaining operations (Lawrence & Lewis,
1996; Lee, 1997). This assistance is highly valued
by suppliers in developing countries, because in
such contexts the implementation of JIT systems
has strategic rather than operational importance in
terms of the nation’s industrial progress (Hum,
1991). Not surprisingly, we find that suppliers
delivering their product JIT to their customers feel
more trust toward their buyers, possibly because the
tightly knit coordination required in JIT allows
both parties to get to know each other’s work habits
and share information.
The significance of this variable may be further
explained in terms of the uncertainty-avoiding
culture as well as the turbulent economical condi-
tions of Turkey, which are characteristics also
typical of most developing countries (Kanungo &
Jaeger, 1990). Also common in developing coun-
tries is the fact that the dominant partner is
typically the buyer (Humphrey & Schmitz, 1998).
In such economically volatile environments, where
actors act in an ‘‘each for his own’’ manner, one
would expect buyer firms to safeguard themselves
by keeping alternative suppliers handy and playing
them off each against other in order to gain
favourable prices and/or delivery dates. By know-
ingly putting itself into a dependent position, the
buyer demonstrates its commitment to the suppli-
er, thus gaining the trust of the smaller and more
vulnerable supplier, especially in a volatile economy
like Turkey. In other words, while we had posited
that the buyer’s investment in soft technologies
might be conducive to supplier trust, owing to its
implications with respect to increased communica-
tion quantity as well as quality, it should be noted
that this investment may be indicative of the
buyer’s trust in the supplier, which in turn fuels
reciprocation.
In a related vein, this study also investigated the
impact of informal commitments from the buyer in
generating supplier trust. We considered informal
commitments to be the supportive actions sig-
nalled by buyers. Narayandas and Rangan (2004)
argue that weaker parties in relationships (which do
not have the power to structure a formal agreement
or set up formal safeguards to protect their invest-
ments) will attempt to construct psychological
agreements that pave the way for subsequent
formalisation. Performance outside the terms of
the contract is important for jump-starting the
trust-building process (Narayandas & Rangan,
2004). In countries with political and economic
uncertainty and cumbersome legal systems, it can
safely be assumed that the effect of such infor-
mal commitments will be even stronger than in
stable environments. Our results supported these
arguments.
The present study also allowed a test of the
generalisability of Dyer and Chu’s model to the
Turkish context. Of the variables proposed in
the Dyer and Chu model, only assistance turned
out to be predictive of trust for the Turkish data.
Assistance was not significant only for the US,
where automakers have historically offered little
assistance (Dyer & Chu, 2000). For Korea and
Turkey automaker assistance is arguably very cri-
tical, as the suppliers lack the required technologi-
cal capability. Yet Dyer and Chu (2000) note that
assistance is high and important in Japan as well,
despite the fact that the suppliers are technically
competent. Taken together, these results seem to
support Doney, Cannon, and Mullen’s (1998)
argument that benevolence is a more common as
well as a more valued trust-building mechanism for
collectivistic, uncertainty-avoiding cultures. It is
interesting to note that, taken with the results for
initial support, Turkish suppliers seem to give more
credence to ongoing assistance rather than the
guidance or support provided at the beginning
of the relationship. Given the historical instability
of the Turkish economy, and the competitive
pressures in the automotive industry, it may be
natural for the suppliers to act in a risk-averse
Trust in buyer–supplier relations Syeda Nazli Wasti and Syeda Arzu Wasti
126
Journal of International Business Studies
fashion and not wish to face the external uncer-
tainty on their own. Being able to look to their
buyers for technical and/or financial assistance
in difficult times may thus generate feelings of
trust.
Looking at the effect on trust of Dyer and Chu’s
variables in the Turkish context can provide further
insight into the dynamics of trust generation. We
do not find a relationship between the duration of
the relationship and the suppliers’ trust towards
their buyers for the Turkish case. As mentioned in
the hypotheses section, given that the Turkish
automotive buyer–supplier relationships have had
periods of distrust, the length of the relationship by
itself may not say much. In other words, the length
of a relationship does not guarantee that manufac-
turing firms will treat suppliers better (Yu, Liao, &
Lin, 2006). Furthermore, since almost all Turkish
suppliers stated that they got repeated orders from
their customers, the effect of continued repeated
exchanges could not be fully captured for the
Turkish case. However, it should be noted that,
because of infrequent model changes in the Turkish
automotive industry, the measure assessed conti-
nuity only throughout the production cycle of a
new model, and not continuity from one new
model to the next. Therefore, while perhaps being
comparable in terms of duration of orders for
components purchased, this variable may not truly
point to equivalent levels of continuity with the
developed country cases.
Stock ownership was not related to trust for the
Turkish case. Such a governance mechanism is not
common in the Turkish context, and indeed,
descriptive statistics for this variable revealed that
only 3% of the respondents responded affirma-
tively to the question that enquired whether the
buyer had any stock ownership. More importantly,
however, Dyer and Chu (2000) also questioned the
meaningfulness of this variable as a determinant of
trust, as they argued that stock ownership could be
better viewed as a substitute for trust. On the other
hand, one can argue that hostage exchanges (e.g.,
shared ownership structure) avoid trust by structur-
ing the transactional context in such a way
that opportunism becomes irrational or deterred
(Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Gulati, 1995). Hence
hostage exchange cannot be considered an indica-
tor of goodwill trust, but rather of some form of
calculative trust. In fact, Bradach and Eccles (1989)
state that Zucker’s (1986) characteristic-based trust
is often tied to formal structures (e.g., financial
cross-shareholdings). Thus it appears that this
variable should also be reconsidered in further
refinements of Dyer and Chu’s (2000) model.
Finally, the intensity of communication, as
reflected in higher levels of face-to-face commu-
nication, was not found to be significant for Turkey,
nor for the other countries in Dyer and Chu’s study.
As noted earlier, the quality of communication can
be assumed to be more important than the
quantity. To explore this possibility, trust was
regressed onto some other variables (included in
the original survey) that tapped into other aspects
of communication. Specifically, in addition to
frequency of face-to-face communication, sharing
of classified technical information, sharing of
unclassified technical information, and the fre-
quency of any mode of communication over a
product development process were included as
predictors of trust. The results showed that sharing
of technical information, classified or unclassified,
predicted trust significantly (po0.10), whereas the
mere frequency of any mode of communication did
not seem to matter. When the two variables
reflective of the communication content were
added to the expanded model, the regression
results indicated that the sharing of classified
technical information was the only significant
communication variable (po0.05). These observa-
tions suggest that in future work a more complex
measurement of the nature of communication is
necessary, attempting to capture the openness,
reciprocity, breadth, and promptness of the com-
munication (Das & Teng, 1998; Kanter, 1994;
Larson, 1992).
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Although a preliminary investigation, this study
contributes to the extant literature on trust in
buyer–supplier relations in several ways. It investi-
gates three new variables particularly pertinent to
developing country contexts as antecedents of
suppliers’ trust towards their buyers. While testing
the effect of these variables on trust, it also extends
the results to incorporate an existing theoretical
model that has been applied to industrialised
countries in order to observe the changes in
explanatory power. As such, this study is an
important addition to the comparative literature
on the world automotive industry.
Nevertheless, the findings of the current investi-
gation must be evaluated, taking into account the
potential limitations of the research design. This
study employed a cross-sectional, single-source
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survey method, which raises concern over the
effects of common method variance. To curtail this
potential problem, the scales in the actual survey
were ordered so that the dependent variable of
interest (trust) did not precede the independent
variables (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). It should also
be noted that some non-significant relations were
also observed in the analysis. Therefore it appears
that common method variance is not a likely
explanation for the results obtained. A related
limitation is that it is not possible to infer causality,
owing to the cross-sectional nature of the data.
Future research that utilises longitudinal designs
with appropriate time lags would be greatly con-
tributory.
As a first attempt at developing measures for a
different context, some limitations regarding the
operationalisation of the proposed new constructs
need to be acknowledged as well. In particular,
the measurement of soft technologies relied on a
single item, which only tapped into JIT delivery. In
future research, this construct may benefit from a
broader measurement that takes into account TQM
practices (Burgess & Gules, 1998; Humphrey, 1998)
or other collaborative practices to enhance transac-
tional dependence that are predicted to generate
goodwill trust (Humphrey, 1998). It should also be
noted that the assumption of a weak legal system
may not hold for all developing countries. Mea-
sures of legal systems are moving more towards the
specifics of institutional effects and the transactions
at hand (e.g., Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
& Shleifer, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
& Vishny, 1998).
Last, but not least, the fact that the data were
collected in a single country and industry may
raise questions regarding the generalisability of the
findings. In this respect, as discussed above, the
results of the present study have clear implications
for other developing countries. Furthermore, from
a practical standpoint, it should be noted that the
Turkish case is not only interesting but also an
important one to study. Despite the constant
change, chronic inflation and political and eco-
nomic instability that have been Turkey’s trade-
mark in the last decades of the 20th century,
Turkey is expected to play a pivotal role in the
future, for it is both the link and the buffer between
Europe and the Middle East and the southern tier of
the former Soviet Union (Berko¨z, 2001; Erdal &
Tatogˇlu, 2002; Garten, 1996). Moreover, Turkey has
well-established political and economic links
through the European Union, of which it is a full
candidate for membership, and Turkish companies
are increasingly establishing joint ventures
with large European multinationals (Tatogˇlu &
Glaister, 1998).
The new variables offered in this study, taken
together with the ones previously studied in the
literature, may also have implications beyond
emerging-market industries.10 Kotabe et al. (2003)
argue that, in both the US and Japan, developing
relation-specific assets facilitates the transfer of
complex technological knowledge, and in turn
affects the benefits accrued by the parties. Hence
the implementation of collaborative and integra-
tive soft technologies such as JIT would be expected
to generate benefits for both parties in the
automotive industries of Western Europe or North
America as well, providing ground for trust-
building. Likewise, informal commitments may
not be as influential in generating trust in
developed economies with more established legal
systems and less volatile economic circumstances,
but they can still have a strong positive effect on
trust. In fact, Dyer and Chu (2000) also give
examples of the use of such commitments by
Japanese automakers with their US suppliers (e.g.,
telling them they would re-win the business if they
performed well). Finally, although in the present
study it did not emerge as a significant variable, the
provision of initial support may be particularly
relevant to new industries. Early-stage support
could be valued, for instance, in any high-techno-
logy industries or industries with large entry
barriers.
Nonetheless, we welcome further replications
that may validate or challenge the current findings.
As businesses grow beyond national borders, stu-
dies that involve examining how antecedents of
trust between exchange partners differ across
different contextual elements should prove useful
to managers. Given the paucity of empirical
research evidence from developing countries, such
efforts will provide a necessary complement to the
growing literature on trust in interorganisational
relationships.
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NOTES
1www.taysad.org.tr, the official website of the
Association of Automobile Parts and Component
Manufacturers, also has supporting reports.
2Ercan Tezer, General Secretary of the Automotive
Manufacturers Association, personal communication,
11 October 2005, 31 October 2005.
3Burak Arkan, Board Member of the Uludag Auto-
motive and Sub-Industry Exporters Union, personal
communication, 18 October 2005, 10 November 2005.
4Bedir (1999) reports that there is a widespread
belief among Turkish automotive suppliers that the
buyer company would reduce or cancel its orders in
case of a shrinkage of its own market. This leads to
suppliers working with more than one buyer to
achieve economies of scale, a factor that Bedir
(2002) claims exacerbates the lack of cooperation
between buyers and suppliers.
5When the remaining 3% of firms that used
contracts were probed as to the nature of the
contracts, it was seen that orders given by fax were
considered to be a contract.
6As an example, another study on the nature of trust
between buyers and sellers by Doney and Cannon
(1997) has a 31% response rate.
7As suggested by one of the reviewers, we also
controlled for foreign ownership. However, neither the
main nor the interaction effects with the hypothesised
antecedents were significant, and the results did not
change.
81: ‘Annually’; 2: ‘Quarterly’; 3: ‘Monthly’; 4: ‘Weekly’.
9Research indicates that the choice of missing
data technique becomes more important when the
amount of missing data approaches 15–20% of the
data set (Roth, 1994). Since the missing data
percentages on the single-item scales were in the
range of 2–7% of the data, mean substitution was
considered appropriate.
10We thank an anonymous reviewer for this
suggestion.
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